• Section 100 BNS defines culpable homicide as the act of causing death with one of these:
  • with the intention of causing death,
  • with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
  • with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

• It is not necessary that any intention should exist with regard to the particular person whose death is caused, as in the familiar example of a shot aimed at one person killing another, or poison intended for one being taken by another.

• The intention demanded by the section must stand in some relation to a person who either is alive, or who is believed by the accused to be alive.

• The knowledge must have reference to the particular circumstances in which the accused is placed.

Question:

• Is a man guilty of culpable homicide if he shoots at a living human being believing him to be dead?

Answer :

• The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of the actual circumstances, but in the light of what he supposed to be the circumstances. It follows that a man is not guilty of culpable homicide if his intention was directed only to what he believed to be a lifeless body.
• Source: Palani Goundan  v.  Emperor ¹

There are three illustrations and three explanations to section 100.

• The first illustration shows that it is not necessary that the intention to cause death should be towards any particular person. It could be quite general in nature. Here, the intention is to cause death of whoever comes that way and walks on the trap.
• The second illustration holds an abettor guilty of committing culpable homicide. In the absence of this illustration, A would be guilty of abetment only, but by force of this illustration, he is to be held guilty of committing culpable homicide.

• Section 101 BNS defines murder to be that culpable homicide where the act by which death is caused has certain specified attributes or where the person committing the act has certain specified knowledge.

Analysis of clause (b):

• The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (b) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition.
• The ‘intention to cause death’ is not an essential requirement of this clause. Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient. It requires both; some intention and some knowledge.
• Instances of cases falling under clause (b):   Where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given, knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of rupture of the liver or spleen or failure of the heart.

Source:  State  of  A.P.  v.   Rayavarapu  Punnayya ²

Analysis of clause (c):

Main requirements for application of clause (c):

• Subjective: The accused had the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present

• Objective: The injury actually caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Once these are established:

• It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death.
• It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature .
• It does not even matter that there was no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death.

Source:          Virsa Singh    v.    State of Punjab ³

Analysis of clause (d):

• Clause (d) of Section 101 would be applicable where knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general – as distinguished from a particular person or persons – being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty.
• Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

• Clause (a) of Section 100 corresponds with clause (a) of Section 101. Both require intention to cause death.
• Clause (b) of Section 100 corresponds with clauses (b) and (c) of Section 101. Both require intention to cause bodily injury. The difference between clause (b) of Section 100 and clause (c) of Section 101 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. The word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 100 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.

• Clause (c) of Section 100 corresponds with clause (d) of Section 101. Both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death.

Source:    State  of  A.P.    v.    Rayavarapu  Punnayya ²

Exceptions

There are five exceptions to section 101, each of which takes away a case from the offence of “murder” and makes it a case of “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”.

Essential ingredients of Exception 1

(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

(2) The provocation must be grave.

(3) The provocation must be sudden.

(4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control.

(5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.

(6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

Source:   K. M.  Nanavati  v.   State   of   Maharashtra ⁴

What is the test of grave and sudden provocation?

• The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
• Thus, it is the test of a reasonable man.
• The test is whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted to the provocation in the same manner in which the accused did.

Is there any uniform standard of reasonableness?

• No, what a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs.

Source:  K. M.  Nanavati   v.    State   of   Maharashtra ⁴    

Essential ingredients of Exception 4

• In whatever way the dispute might have started, the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them, in respect of guilt, upon equal footing. A ‘sudden fight’ implies mutual provocation and blows on each side.
• The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side.
• There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter.
• Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down.
• For application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner.
• The expression ‘undue advantage’ as used in the provision means ‘unfair advantage’.

Source:  Ghapoo   Yadav  v.    State  of   M.P. ⁵

Comparison between Exception 1 and Exception 4

• Exception 4 is founded upon the same principle as Exception 1, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in case of Exception 1, there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do.
• There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation.
• In whatever way the dispute might have started, the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them, in respect of guilt, upon equal footing. A ‘sudden fight’ implies mutual provocation and blows on each side.
• The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side.

Source:   Ghapoo   Yadav  v.    State  of   M.P. 5

• ‘Culpable homicide’ is the genus and ‘murder’ is its species.

• All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa.

• Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder’, is ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’.

Source:   State  of  A.P.   v.   Rayavarapu  Punnayya ²

How to decide whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder:

Whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.

(1) The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another.

(2) Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 100.

(3) If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 101 is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section 101.

• If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 105, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 100 is applicable.

• If answer to this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 101, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable u/s 105. Else, it is murder, punishable under section 103.

Source:   State  of  A.P.   v.   Rayavarapu  Punnayya ²

Three types of punishment for culpable homicide:

For the purpose of fixing punishment, the Sanhita practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide.

• The first is what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 101 as ‘murder’.

• The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 105.

• Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 105.

Source:   State  of  A.P.  v.   Rayavarapu  Punnayya ²

It is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.

• The word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 100 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.