SC on Assent of Bills by Governor and President

TOPIC:     Assent of Bills by the Governor of a State and the President of India

Fundamental question:

Whether there is any time-limit within which the Governor of a State and the President of India are required to act when a Bill passed by the State Legislature is presented to them under Articles 200 and 201?

Summarized version [by Delhi Law Academy Jaipur] of the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu delivered by a two-judge Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan on 08th April, 2025:

Original Judgment:   415 pages

Summarized version:  5 pages

Fundamental questions of law decided by the Supreme Court in this Judgment:

• Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?

• Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers? If not, whether the constitutional scheme has vested the Governor with some discretion in discharge of his functions under Article 200?

• Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review?

• What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution?

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State of Tamil Nadu  v.  Governor of Tamil Nadu

Supreme Court of India

08th April, 2025

JUDGMENT

2. The State of Tamil Nadu, being aggrieved by the action of the Governor on few issues of prime public importance, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking appropriate reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition. The petitioner is aggrieved by the action, or rather inaction, on part of the Governor of Tamil Nadu in discharge of the following functions:

(i) Withholding of assent to and reserving for consideration of the President, by the Governor of 10 Bills enacted by the Legislature for the State of Tamil Nadu.

………….

36. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions of paramount constitutional importance fall for our determination:
37. I) What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?
38. II) Whether the Governor can reserve a bill for the consideration of the President at the time when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance and had declared withholding of assent thereto?

III) Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution?

IV)Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers? If not, whether the constitutional scheme has vested the Governor with some discretion in discharge of his functions under Article 200?

1. V) Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review?
2. VI) What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution?
3. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions of law formulated by us as under:

(VI) Neither the concept of ‘pocket veto’ nor that of ‘absolute veto’ finds place within the constitutional scheme and mechanism envisaged under Article 200 of the Constitution. The substantive part of Article 200 consciously uses the expression “shall declare” to signify that there is no scope of inaction, and whenever a bill is presented to the Governor, he is under a constitutional obligation to adopt one of the three courses of action available therein. Further, the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso permeates Article 200 with a sense of expediency and does not allow the Governor to sit on the bills and exercise pocket veto over them. Similarly, by virtue of the first proviso being intrinsically and  inextricably attached to the option of withholding of assent, there  is no scope for the Governor to declare a simpliciter withholding of  assent, meaning thereby that ‘absolute veto’ is also impermissible  under Article 200.

(VII) As a general rule, it is not open for the Governor to reserve a bill for the consideration of the President once it is presented to him in the second round, after having been returned to the House previously as per the first proviso. The use of the expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” appearing in the first proviso places a clear embargo on the Governor and is a clear enunciation of the requirement that the Governor must assent to a bill which is presented to him after complying with the procedure laid down in the first proviso. The only exception to this general rule is when the  bill presented in the second round is materially different from the  one presented to the Governor in the first instance, as discussed in  paragraph 204 of this judgment. In such a scenario, it would be open for the Governor to choose from the three options provided in the substantive part of Article 200.

(VIII) In the facts of the present case, the reservation by the Governor of the ten Bills for the consideration of the President in the second round was illegal, erroneous in law and is thus liable to be set aside.  As a result, any subsequent action taken upon the said Bills by the President also does not survive and is thus set aside.

(IX) The Bills, having been pending with the Governor for an unduly long period of time, and the Governor having acted with clear lack of bona fides in reserving the Bills for the consideration of the President, immediately after the pronouncement of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra), are deemed to have been assented to by the Governor on the date when they were presented to him after being reconsidered.

(X) There is no expressly specified time-limit for the discharge of the functions by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution. Despite there being no prescribed time-limit, Article 200 cannot be read in a manner which allows the Governor to not take action upon bills which are presented to him for assent and thereby delay and essentially roadblock the law-making machinery in the State.

(XI) The use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent.

(XII) The settled position of law is that where no time-limit for the exercise of a power is prescribed, the same must be exercised in a reasonable time period. Guided by the decisions of this Court in A.G. Perarivalan (supra) and Keisham (supra), we find that it is no more res-integra that the courts are well-empowered to prescribe a time-limit for the discharge of any function or exercise of any power which, by its very nature, demands expediency.

(XIII) Prescription of a general time-limit by this Court, within which the ordinary exercise of power by the Governor under Article 200 must take place, is not the same thing as amending the text of the Constitution to read in a time-limit which would fundamentally change the procedure and mechanism stipulated by Article 200. Prescription of such time-limits within the scheme of Article 200 is with a view to lay down a determinable judicial standard for ascertaining the reasonable exercise of such power and to curtail any arbitrary inaction. This Court while prescribing a time-limit for the exercise of power, is guided by the inherent expedient nature of the procedure prescribed under Article 200.

(XIV) Keeping in mind the constitutional significance of Article 200 and the role it plays in the federal polity of the country, the following timelines are being prescribed. Failure to comply with these timelines would make the inaction of the Governors subject to judicial review by the courts:

(i) In case of either withholding of assent or reservation of the bill for the consideration of the President, upon the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor is expected to take such an action forthwith, subject to a maximum period of one-month;

(ii) In case of withholding of assent contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return the bill together with a message within a maximum period of three months;

(iii) In case of reservation of bills for the consideration of the President contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor shall make such reservation within a maximum period of three months;

(iv) In case of presentation of a bill after reconsideration in accordance with the first proviso, the Governor must grant assent forthwith, subject to a maximum period of one-month.

(XV) As the general rule, the Governor in exercise of his functions under Article 200 is required to abide by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The only exceptions to this rule can be traced to the second proviso to Article 200 and Article 163(1) of the Constitution. Thus, only in instances where the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion, would he be justified in exercising his powers under Article 200 contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers. Further, any exercise of discretion by the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 is amenable to judicial review.

(XVI) Under Article 200 of the Constitution, the Governor does not possess any discretion in the exercise of his functions and has to mandatorily abide by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. The only exceptions to this general rule are as follows:

(i) Where the bill is of a description as provided under the second proviso to Article 200;

(ii) Where the bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of the President is a condition precedent before the bill can take effect as law;

 (iii) Where the bill is of a nature that if allowed to take effect then it would undermine the Constitution by placing the fundamental principles of a representative democracy in peril.

(XVII) Under Article 201, the occasion for the reservation of a bill for the consideration of the President by the Governor may arise where a constitutional provision makes the assent of the President to be a condition precedent to a State legislation becoming enforceable or for the purpose of securing some immunity to the State legislation. Such a requirement can be found in Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. The second proviso to Article 200 also makes reservation for the consideration of the President mandatory. As we have also discussed, there may be certain other situations where by peril to fundamental principles of representative democracy, the Governor may, in exercise of his discretion, reserve a bill for the consideration of the President.

(XVIII) There is no ‘pocket veto’ or ‘absolute veto’ available to the President in discharge of his functions under Article 201. The use of the expression “shall declare” makes it mandatory for the President to make a choice between the two options available under the substantive part of Article 201, that is, to either grant assent or to withhold assent to a bill. The constitutional scheme does not, in any manner, provide that a constitutional authority can exercise its powers under the Constitution arbitrarily. This necessarily implies that the withholding of assent under Article 201 is to be accompanied by the furnishing of reasons for such withholding. We cannot say for a moment that the President would be allowed to not exercise the proviso to Article 201 and not communicate reasons for the withholding of assent to the State legislature, as doing so would make the very inclusion of the proviso in Article 200 redundant. Thus, the proviso to Article 201 could be said to attach with the option of withholding of assent.

435. For all the foregoing reasons we have reached the following conclusion:
436. The reservation of the ten Bills which are the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition by the Governor for the consideration of the President on 28.11.2023 after their due reconsideration by the State legislature in terms of the first proviso to Article 200 being in contravention of the procedure prescribed under Article 200 as explained by us hereinabove is declared to be erroneous in law, non-est and thus, is hereby set-aside.
437. As a result of the above, any consequential steps that might have been taken by the President on these ten Bills is equally non-est and is hereby set-aside.
438. Having regard to the unduly long period of time for which these Bills were kept pending by the Governor before the ultimate declaration of withholding of assent and in view of the scant respect shown by the Governor to the decision of this Court in State of Punjab (supra) and other extraneous considerations that appear to be writ large in the discharge of his functions, we are left with no other option but to exercise our inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution for the purpose of declaring these ten Bills as deemed to have been assented on the date when they were presented to the Governor after being reconsidered by the State legislature i.e., on 18.11.2023.