🧾 J U D G M E N T

In this appeal by special leave a short but an interesting question falls for determination. “whether the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has power to condone the delay in the filing of appeal before it under the said section”.

The appellant is a tenant occupying the suit premises belonging to respondent-landlord. The respondent filed Rent Control Petition before the Rent Control Court, Kannur, seeking eviction of the appellant-tenant under Section 11(2)(a)(b) and Section 11(3) of the Rent Act on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide need for the purpose of conducting a grocery shop for his son, Plaintiff 2. The Rent Control Court exercising its power under Section 11 of the Rent Act passed an order for possession against the appellant on 28-10-1993. The appellant applied for a certified copy of the said order on 29-10-1993. He obtained a certified copy of the order on 23-11-1993. As per Section 18(1)(b) of the Rent Act an appeal has to be filed within thirty days from the date of order of Rent Control Court. In computing thirty days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against has to be excluded. Ultimately the appeal was filed by the appellant on 31-12-1993 before the appellate authority, namely, District Judge, Thalassery under Section 18 of the Act. The said appeal was also accompanied by IA for condonation of delay supported by the affidavit of the appellant. The appellate authority by its order dated 11-1-1994 dismissed the appeal as barred by time.

It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.

• There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
• The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:

• In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
• For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether Section 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under Section 18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the Act the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied.

When the First Schedule at the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time-limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period, while the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied.

The present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this change it is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion.

As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a court and the period of limitation prescribed therein under Section 18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings.

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