⚖️ WHERE A SPECIAL OR LOCAL LAW PRESCRIBES A DIFFERENT PERIOD OF LIMITATION

🏛️ Supreme Court on section 29(2) Limitation Act

• When First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time-limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule such appeal can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period
• Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act

📖 Section 29(1)

• Nothing in this Act shall affect
  • section 25 of the Indian Contract Act 1872

📖 Section 29(2)

• Where
  • any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application
  • a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule
• provisions of section 3 shall apply
  • as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and
• for determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law
  • provisions of sections 4 to 24 shall apply
  • only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law

📖 Section 29(3)

• Save as otherwise provided
  • in any law on marriage and divorce
• this Act shall not apply
  • to any suit or other proceeding under such law

❓ Question:

What are the requirements that must be met for invoking the provisions of section 29(2)?

Ans:

• Two requirements have to be satisfied for invoking this provision:
• (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
• (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

❓ Question:

What are the consequences once these requirements are satisfied?

Ans:

• If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow.
• These consequences are:
• (i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
• (ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

⚖️ Case study: Mukri Gopalan v. Aboobacker [1995 SC]

The question

Whether the appellate authority constituted u/s 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965 has power to condone delay in filing of appeal before it?

Facts of the case

• The appellant is a tenant occupying the suit premises belonging to respondent-landlord. The respondent filed a Petition before the Rent Control Court seeking eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide need for the purpose of conducting a grocery shop for his son.
• The Rent Control Court passed an order for possession against the appellant.
• As per Section 18(1)(b) of the Rent Act an appeal has to be filed within thirty days from the date of order of the Rent Control Court. The appeal was filed on 31-12-1993.

Issue:

Whether in computing thirty days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against has to be excluded?

Subsidiary question

Whether Section 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act?

Ans: Yes.

🕒 What happens when Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal

• The Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority u/s 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal.
• A situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied.
• When First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time-limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule such appeal can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period
• While the former permits filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former.
• Thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

⚖️ Effect of application of section 29(2)

• When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply.
• Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted.
• There is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority u/s 18 of the Act.
• Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of can be said to have been satisfied.

⚖️ Decision

• The appellate authority constituted u/s 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a court and the period of limitation prescribed therein u/s 18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.
• Such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) and consequently Section 5 would also be applicable to such proceedings.
• Appellate authority will have ample jurisdiction to consider the question whether delay in filing such appeals could be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the applicant for delay in filing such appeals.
• The proceedings are remanded to the appellate authority with a direction that it shall consider the IA filed by the applicant for condonation of delay on its own merits and then proceed further in accordance with law.